




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Africa Review



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24 August 1984

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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis

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Articles

Liberia: Early Party Maneuvering

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Civilian politicking has begun in earnest with the lifting of the four-year-old ban on politics in July. While the armed forces and members of the disbanded People's Redemption Council trade charges of attempting to subvert the electoral process, civilian politicians have gone on a campaign spree, announcing presidential candidacies, holding rallies, and forming a dozen parties. The elections are scheduled for October 1985. Although Head of State Doe's reluctant decision to allow parties to form brings Liberia a step closer to the return to civilian rule, many observers continue to question his commitment to a fair election.

The Campaign—Early Entrants

Politicians began announcing the formation of parties within hours of Doe's edict, and new hopefuls continue to spring up almost daily. We believe, however, that many of these organizations will find it difficult to meet the newly announced financial requirements for registration, gain widespread support, or weather harassment by the regime. The Special Elections Commission has decreed that a party must have a minimum of \$50,000 in cash, \$100,000 in securities and bonds, and 500 members each in at least six of Liberia's 11 counties. These requirements are designed in part to prevent the formation of narrowly based tribal parties, but also will prevent political mavericks from challenging Doe.

In the view of the US Embassy and most Liberian political observers, Doe's National Democratic Party of Liberia is the prohibitive favorite to win the presidency and the bulk of legislative constituencies. The party had the jump by quietly organizing in

upcountry Liberia, where Doe hopes to capitalize on his popularity as the country's first tribal head of state. Doe's widespread support in the Army, along with his powers of incumbency, will force other parties to tread carefully in conducting anti-Doe campaigns.

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Most other parties had little choice but to wait to see whether Doe would run and what restrictions would be placed on rivals before tipping their own hands. The major opposition leaders sent conflicting signals about their intentions to run for office while awaiting Doe's decision—a hesitancy that kept their organizations in disarray.

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We anticipate that three or four coalitions will form as the elections approach. While other groups will undoubtedly surface, the parties with the strongest chance of surviving include the United People's Party (UPP), Liberian People's Party (LPP), Unity Party (UP), and Liberian Action Party (LAP). The UPP and LPP grew out of student-based groups that have led the opposition to Doe since 1980, and they most likely will be the prime recipients of Doe's intolerance of criticism. The UP and LAP include the country's most experienced civilian government technocrats and prominent business executives, but their ties to the old regime probably will limit their appeal to upcountry tribesmen, who constitute the overwhelming majority of voters.

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Storm Clouds Brewing?

Public support for Doe's lifting of the ban on political activity has been tempered by misgivings over his apparent tampering with the political process. Among recent government actions that have led many

Liberia:
Political Parties and Presidential Candidates

Party	Presidential Candidate	Party Officers
Unity Party (UP)	Edward Kesselly	
National Integration Party (NIP)	E. Sumo Jones	James Supuwood
People's Liberation Party (PLP)	Mrs. Hawa Clemens Danquah	
Republican Party (RP)		Jiba Mu
National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)	Samuel Doe	Numerous members of Interim National Assembly and People's Redemption Council, including George Boley (Secretary General), Tambakai Jangaba, Bai Gbala, Andrew Redd, Charles Williams
Liberian People's Party (LPP)		Amos Sawyer, Harry Yuan (former INA member)
Convention Democratic Party (CDP)		Wade Appleton (Chairman)
Liberian Unification Party (LUP)	Gabriel Kpoleh	
Liberian Action Party (LAP)	Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (probable)	Tuan Wreh (Chairman), Harry Greaves (Secretary General), Alvin Jones, Ibrahima Kaba, Nadei Brookley, Byron Tarr

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Liberia:**Political Parties and Presidential Candidates (continued)**

Party	Presidential Candidate	Party Officers	
United People's Party (UPP)		Gabriel Baccus Matthews (Chairman), Oscar Quiah (Secretary General), Marcus Dahn, Richard Gaye, Wesley Johnson	
First All-Integrated Republican Party (FAIR)		Edwin Dunbar	
Women's interest group		Edith Dennis, Clavenda Bright-Parker, Emma Campbell, Grace Minor	
Unannounced		Scott Toweh, Jackson Doe, Clifford Flemister	

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opposition figures to question Doe's commitment to a fair election are:

- The jailing of opposition leader Amos Sawyer, head of the Liberian People's Party.
- The requirement that individuals who wish to campaign for any party but Doe's resign their government posts.
- A ban on making statements intended to damage the reputations of government officials, which many newsmen fear will be used to gag them as well as opposition spokesmen.
- Doe's announcement of his candidacy at a military barracks, apparently to underscore the military nature and support of his regime.
- The circulation of pamphlets by the opposition charging that Doe's government will stage a fake coup to justify scuttling of the return to civilian rule.
- The arrest of prominent newspaper reporters who had exposed corruption in the Doe administration.
- The decision to form an Interim National Assembly, whose handpicked members now will benefit from incumbency.

Based on past practice, we believe that Doe may decide once again to alter the timetable for the transition. Although aware that delaying the elections further would erode his domestic credibility and be resisted by international donors, he could decide to improve his electoral chances by advancing the inauguration of the new government from its scheduled date of January 1986.

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Further manipulation of the process could spark dissatisfied Liberians to take to the streets in protest. Although opposition groups are disorganized and pose little threat to the regime, the overreaction of the military to incidents could lead to violence.

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The special relationship with the United States and extensive US commercial and official interests in Liberia are likely to become major election issues and

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will push the United States, however reluctantly, onto center stage of the Liberian campaign. More moderate political parties are likely to scramble to portray themselves as "America's choice," while leftist parties may step up criticism of US "interference" in the electoral process. The US Embassy already reports that many Liberians interpret high-level US official meetings with Doe as signifying US support for Doe's candidacy.

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South Africa: The Herstigte Nasionale Party¹

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The Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party) represents the extreme right of the South African political spectrum. While the party does not hold any seats in either the national parliament or the four provincial assemblies, it has support in lower class Afrikaner urban and rural communities that gives it the potential to be a formidable member of any rightwing coalition.

1982, following its split from the National Party. The Conservatives, led by two former cabinet ministers and with considerable financial support, had 18 seats in the parliament as well as representatives on provincial and urban councils. Differences between the two parties have always been more a question of style than of substance—the brash working class of the Herstigte Nasionale clashing with the self-styled intellectualism of the Conservative Party.

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Varying Political Fortunes

The Herstigte Nasionale Party was founded in August 1969 following the defection of four parliamentary members of the ruling National Party over the issue of integrated sports. During the following 12 years, it failed to win a single national, provincial, or city election, and in the 1970, 1974, and 1977 general elections, it won no more than 4 percent of the total vote. The decision by the National Party in the late 1970s to grant limited political rights to Coloreds and Indians strengthened the party, as thousands of Nationalists deserted their party. In the 1981 general election, the Herstigte Nasionale challenged more National Party seats than any other opposition party, winning 191,000 votes.

In 1983, the Herstigtters refused any compromise with the Conservatives and boldly competed against both them and the National Party in a series of byelections in the northern Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Only in the city of Pretoria was the Herstigte Party successful; it finished third in four other elections for parliamentary seats. In several constituencies, intransigence led to a slow leak of its support to the Conservatives. The US Embassy speculated that the Conservatives played on the Herstigte's reputation as the party of lower class, violence-prone, racist fanatics to win anti-Nationalist Afrikaners to the new party.

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Analysis of the 1981 election by South African and British academics showed that the party had increased its support by a factor of five, taking—according to press reports—between 20 and 25 percent of Afrikaner votes. The studies concluded that it had strong support in working-class urban districts near Johannesburg, as well as rural districts in the northern Transvaal, and that the party seriously threatened 20 to 30 National Party seats.

Toward a Rightwing Coalition

Both the Herstigtters and the Conservatives reject the new Constitution, insisting that there must be Colored and Indian “homelands,” and both are critical of South Africa's rapprochement with Mozambique. Neither party accepts any change in the racial laws, holding that strict social apartheid is necessary to protect whites.

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The development of the party into a single effective Afrikaner opposition was directly altered by the formation of the Conservative Party in February

Despite this common ground, there has never been any love lost between the leaders of the two movements. Jaap Marais, the Herstigte leader, speaks

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¹ This is the first of two articles on the political parties of the South African right wing.

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Jaap Marais**Leader of the Herstigte Nasionale Party
(Since 1977)**

Jaap Marais was one of the four National Party parliamentarians who formed the Herstigte Nasionale Party in 1969, having previously served as the Nationalist member of parliament for a Pretoria constituency. Marais served as deputy party leader from 1969 to 1977, before taking over the party leadership from the ailing Albert Hertzog. He has been an unsuccessful parliamentary candidate in four general elections, as well as several byelections.

the argot of the working-class Afrikaner with its racist condescension of blacks. Andries Treurnicht, the Conservative leader, is a former Dutch Reformed Church clergyman and newspaper editor, who articulates the argument for separate development on an intellectual plane. Furthermore, Treurnicht presided over the Afrikaner Broederbond in the 1970's when all Herstigte members were expelled from the semisecret Afrikaner organization, and has defeated Japp Marais in three different elections.

The formation of the Afrikaner Volkswag (Afrikaner People's Guard) in May 1984 was the first step in healing the rifts on the right. Created by dissident Afrikaner intellectuals, the principal role of this group is, according to US Embassy reporting, to mobilize rightwing antagonists and wavering adherents of the National Party. In June, the Herstigtters and the Conservatives informally agreed to contest jointly two Transvaal provincial byelections. The victory of the Conservatives in one contest, and their suprising strong showing in another gave further impetus to the movement for political coalition, according to press and US Embassy reporting.

On 6 August, the two parties agreed to an electoral pact to jointly contest future byelections. Marais and Treurnicht issued a joint statement saying it was "more necessary than ever before to replace the government." Their statement also noted that the new Constitution was the "first step toward the subjugation of whites in South Africa."

Outlook

Despite continuing friction between the leaders of the two parties, we believe that the Herstigte Nasionale Party probably will remain a junior partner in the rightwing alliance. With Conservative support in working-class Afrikaner suburbs, we believe that the Herstigte Party could win two to five seats in byelections over the next 24 months. Furthermore, Herstigte support may allow the Conservatives to carry a number of districts in the Transvaal and Orange Free State.

the rightwing candidates together could take several seats in eastern Cape Province, particularly in constituencies where the Herstigte candidates ran strong races in the 1981 general election.

The Conservative Party/Herstigte Nasionale Party alliance, however, still lacks the financial resources to challenge the ruling National Party. Neither party has a daily paper, and both lack the funds to develop the political apparatus that has made the National Party such a formidable political force. The right can only hope for further strife within the Nationalist movement. Should the National Party again divide following scandal—such as the one forcing former Prime Minister B. J. Vorster from office in 1977—or a major foreign policy defeat, disaffected members of the party would most probably align themselves with the rightwing alliance to challenge the present Nationalist leadership.

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
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Congo: Sassou Consolidates A Moderate Position [REDACTED]

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Sassou's most controversial move was sacking Thystere Tchicaya, the party's leftist ideologue and reportedly the country's second most powerful figure after Sassou [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Sassou has so strengthened his control over his ministers that he can make all key decisions. As the new chief of government, cabinet ministers must report directly to him, and they have been forced to vacate their party posts. The separation of government and party duties ensures that Sassou's rivals will find it more difficult to build independent power bases in both the party and government. Moreover, Sassou increased the number of patronage positions he can dole out by expanding the party's political bureau to 13 members, whom he can name without the approval of the central committee, itself expanded from 60 to 75 members [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Many supporters of Tchicaya believe that he was framed so that Sassou could remove a key leftist roadblock to his tentative turn to the West. The US Embassy suggests that Tchicaya could now become the spokesman, or at least symbol, of a nascent leftist opposition. [REDACTED]

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Although Sassou has rid himself of some potential troublemakers and tightened his grip on government machinery, he still has powerful enemies who could hinder his turn to the West. [REDACTED]

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While Sassou attempted to paper over many divisive issues at the congress, we believe that his manipulation of the congress heightened tribal, ideological, and personal antagonisms. [REDACTED]

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[redacted] He turned instead to Ange Edouard Pongui, a financial technocrat, who will carry out Sassou's orders as Prime Minister. [redacted]

Looking for Western Aid

We believe that Sassou's new Cabinet, composed primarily of pragmatic technocrats, will aid him in his efforts to obtain badly needed Western development assistance. Sassou will seek to mend fences with the West—damaged by the rhetorical outbursts of his former Foreign Minister during Cuban Vice President Malmierca's visit last May—in hopes of attracting foreign aid and investment. The US Embassy indicates that Brazzaville hopes to diversify its oil-dependent export economy by developing a paper pulp mill, establishing regional chambers of commerce to cut red tape and improve communication between small businessmen and the government, building roads to the interior, and encouraging foreign and domestic venture capitalism. Congo will look primarily to France and the United States, its chief trade and investment partners, in these efforts. [redacted]

We believe that Sassou is likely to explore possibilities for increasing Western military assistance in the near term. Although the Soviet Union is Congo's principal supplier of military aid, the US Embassy reports that Brazzaville is unhappy with Moscow's refusal to provide significant economic assistance. [redacted]

[redacted] is displeased with the poor quality of Soviet training and equipment and Moscow's demand for immediate payment for services. Nevertheless, we believe that Sassou will move cautiously toward the West in an effort to avoid jeopardizing the military's current supply of Soviet arms. [redacted]

Sassou hopes to bolster his image as a regional statesman by hosting successful talks between the pro-Western Chadian Government and Libyan-backed dissidents, although Chadian squabbling and Libyan machinations could limit his success. Sassou's cooperation with Zaire to deter anti-Mobutu terrorists could also help build Western confidence in his leadership. [redacted]

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Liberia:
Critical Times for the Military

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Liberia's military is showing signs of strain as it attempts to control the transition to civilian rule while protecting its economic and political interests. The armed forces have done little in four years in power under Head of State Doe to lay a firm foundation for a civilian government. Rumors of coup plots circulate in Monrovia with increasing frequency. Although the military will remain the dominant force throughout the 18-month transition period, its ability to act as a stabilizing force during this period is doubtful. We expect, moreover, that ethnic divisions and political rivalries in the military will become even sharper as political activity increases.

Profile of the Liberian Armed Forces

was deliberately kept small, poorly equipped, and politically corrupted. From its creation in 1904 as the Liberian Frontier Force until recently, the Army's functions were limited to internal security and occasional international deployments such as the UN peacekeeping operation in the early 1960s in Zaire.

The coup in April 1980 that brought Doe to power came against the backdrop of the long exclusion of Liberia's tribal majority from political and economic power, and the lack of political and social reform following the rice riots in 1979 in Monrovia. Although many rural tribesmen, particularly the Lomas, saw a military career as a way of getting ahead, lucrative senior officer positions traditionally had remained the preserve of the coastal settler aristocracy and its co-opted tribal allies.

The coup transformed the military overnight into the country's single most important political institution. While US Embassy reporting amply documents that Doe is in effect a one-man government, the military has been drawn into all levels of the administration,

including 22 soldiers who sit on the 58-member Interim National Assembly. Civilian members of the cabinet hold military commissions and are subject to military discipline. In addition, military officers participate in the management of parastatal corporations, county governments, and the judiciary.

In our judgment, the Army's political activism has undermined its already suspect ability to carry out its military mission.

that many units are undermanned and personnel rosters are often inflated by senior officers to facilitate payroll skimming. Virtually all equipment is poorly maintained. The concentration of troops in the Monrovia area—three of six infantry battalions and most support units, for example, are deployed in or near the capital—leaves the hinterland areas only thinly garrisoned.

Nor do the armed forces constitute a strongly nationalistic or cohesive force.

that the enlisted ranks are a disparate group of ill-trained, poorly disciplined, and semiliterate tribesmen who see military service primarily as a means of providing for their families and gaining entry to modern society. Loyalties are rooted in tribe, rather than profession or class, and support for commanders from other tribes is tenuous at best.

We believe that the Army is capable of handling occasional small-scale civil disturbances, but that it would be hard pressed to put down repeated or widespread demonstrations. Moreover, sources of the US Embassy doubt that troops would be willing to fire at civilians should violent demonstrations occur. Most soldiers, for example, joined in the rioting and

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looting in Monrovia in 1979 after the government threatened to increase the price of rice. [redacted]

Divisive Issues

Liberia's military enters the transition period divided. In our judgment there is little likelihood that any government will be able to placate or control the armed forces or take the loyalty of the military for granted. [redacted]

Ethnic Rivalries. In the view of many tribesmen, Doe's "revolution" has replaced the traditional elitist domination of Liberia and its military with that of his fellow Krahn. Lomas and Kpelles from northwestern Liberia are still the largest group in uniform, but see their dominance being gradually diluted by the increasing numbers of recruits from southeastern Liberia, particularly Krahn and Kru. Several hundred Krahn and Kru tribesmen have been brought into the Army since early 1983 despite an official ban on new recruitment intended to hold down payroll costs. Moreover, Kru and Krahn are disproportionately represented in the officer corps, particularly in the higher ranks, based on their presumed loyalty to Doe rather than their military qualifications (see table). [redacted]

Doe is well aware of the impact of tribalism, but appears to believe that he has no political choice but to rely on his kinsmen. Since coming to power, Doe has nipped in the bud at least 14 alleged military plots motivated at least in part by personal and tribal grievances. [redacted]

[redacted] Doe is protected by a special bodyguard unit, whose largely Krahn members are personally selected by him for demonstrated loyalty. [redacted]

Bread-and-Butter Issues. Although the military is still far better off than most civilians, the general decline of the economy has affected all ranks, particularly enlisted men. Paychecks are generally two months late, and even Doe's bodyguard unit is grumbling about poor working conditions, [redacted]. Moreover, inflation, food

shortages, and rising civilian unemployment all add to the drain on soldiers' paychecks from the sizable number of extended family members who depend on them. Deductions for government development projects in their home districts further erode soldiers' income. Doe's recent decision to evict military squatters from confiscated civilian housing adds to the soldiers' frustrations, [redacted]

[redacted] For example, troops concentrated in and around Monrovia were barely able to carry out orders to deploy to the border during a temporary spat with Sierra Leone in 1983, arriving largely in rented vehicles and carrying unserviceable weapons. At times, the Army has difficulty in providing even such basic necessities as uniforms and food. [redacted]

Attitudes Toward a Return to Civilian Rule.

[redacted] the military is anxious and uncertain about the country's scheduled return to civilian rule and split over the type of government best suited for Liberia. [redacted] many in the military doubt that a civilian regime would be able to manage effectively the country's economic and political problems. [redacted] all ranks fear possible retribution for misdeeds committed since 1980 and that budget cuts by a civilian government would make their economic situation even worse. On the other hand, Defense Minister Allison and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Dubar, [redacted] believe the military would best be served by returning to the barracks and letting civilians shoulder the burden of

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Ethnicity and the Liberian Military

(Percent)

	Population of 2.2 Million	Pre-Doe Era		The Doe Regime	
		Indigenous Officers, 1975 ^a	Indigenous Enlisted Men, 1975	Ruling Military Council, 1984	Cabinet, 1984
Mande-speaking tribes of north-western Liberia					
Gbandi	3				
Gio	9			14	16
Kpelle	20	8	15	11	
Loma	6	16	60	11	11
Mandingo	4				5
Mano	7			11	
Vai	3				5
Kru-speaking tribes of south-eastern Liberia					
Bassa	14	14			
Grebo	8	12		9	11
Krahn	5	13		27	21
Kru	8	24	17	18	16
West Atlantic tribes					
Gola	5	8			
Kissi	3				
Other tribes	2	5	8		
Americo-Liberians	3				16

^a No reliable service-wide survey of the military's ethnic composition has been made since 1975. Inflation of personnel rosters to facilitate payroll skimming by officers makes Doe-era statistics suspect.

administration and take the blame for a failing economy.

We believe that widespread support for leftist parties would pose a delicate problem for the military. Although a majority of the military reportedly is opposed to the election of a leftist, civilian government, such an event probably would provoke fierce debate in all ranks. There probably would be strong pressures within the military to step in, void the election, and reimplement military rule. On the other hand, we believe there are those who are committed to returning to the barracks and believe that the military

can begin improving its military capabilities only when it steps away from direct political activity.

The Doe Factor. Attitudes toward the return to civilian rule are complicated by divided opinion over what role, if any, Doe should play in the new government. Although Doe is the odds-on favorite to win the presidential election, his candidacy has fostered considerable debate in the military.

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increasingly intolerant of opposition politicians and any campaign rhetoric they believe threatens Doe's electoral prospects. []

We also believe senior officers will pay close heed to how open an election campaign Doe permits. In our judgment, Doe could provoke serious unrest if he gives the appearance of being too blatant in his attempts to rig the elections. In particular, Doe's formation of a political intelligence unit, and manipulating election laws to disqualify candidates and parties for ideological reasons may not sit well with senior officers concerned about Liberia's international image. []

Although impossible to predict with certainty, in our estimation, three basic scenarios are most probable: a grudging toleration of the status quo by the military, a takeover by senior officers, or a coup by junior officers or enlisted men. []

More of the Same—Muddling Through. Under this scenario—which we believe most likely at present—armed forces “professionals” who prefer to remain aloof from politics would carry the day. Although displeased with some aspects of Doe's rule, most uniformed personnel would give grudging support to Doe. This scenario, however, requires that Doe be responsive to the needs of the military and seek the least divisive route through the thicket of conflicting political, economic, and military demands that he will face during the coming months. Doe would need to offset potentially unpopular moves intended to advance his own candidacy—such as muzzling the press and selectively harassing rivals and critics—with “presidential” gestures of forceful leadership and magnanimity. In any event, Doe is unlikely to make significant headway in dealing with more fundamental issues such as carrying out structural economic reforms, curbing corruption, and improving government management. []

A Palace Coup. We believe that over time Doe's senior military and civilian advisers could come to believe that political stability and a restoration of Liberia's international image requires Doe's removal.

Outlook and Implications for the United States

Liberia's political climate during the 18-month transition is likely to remain uncertain and subject to sudden change. In our view, Doe will have difficulty balancing the conflicting expectations and demands within the military and will remain vulnerable to a coup by frustrated soldiers. In particular, Doe will find it difficult to balance pressures to maintain and even increase benefits for the military with pressure from US and international lenders that the government exercise greater fiscal austerity. Paradoxically, if Doe repeats the nationalistic posturing of last spring in hopes of extracting more US aid, he risks antagonizing those military officers who counsel against straining relations with Washington. []

Doe also will be closely watched for his handling of the ethnic factor. Continued recruitment of Krahns into the Army almost certainly will further offend non-Krahns. For their part, Krahns may become

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Such a palace coup could involve Doe's quiet but forceful ouster by senior officers, his assassination—perhaps by one or more disgruntled former military council members—or a more widespread and bloody takeover. [REDACTED]

The stability of such a regime would depend in large measure on the ethnic composition of the new government and the response of Krahn enlisted men. Over the short run we believe senior officers, who reportedly enjoy respect for their professionalism among the rank and file, could rally enough support to restore order and establish an interim government. These officers would have little choice but to turn to civilian experts to keep the government functioning and to plead for US understanding and increased aid. [REDACTED]

We hold out little hope, however, that senior officers would prove significantly more adept than their predecessors in implementing longer term economic reforms or developing stable political institutions. While remaining committed to a return to civilian rule, the process most likely would be delayed as senior officers attempted to solidify their control. [REDACTED]

A Junior-Level Coup. We cannot discount a bloody coup by frustrated members of the disbanded People's Redemption Council, unknown junior officers, or enlisted men. Tribal animosities and weakened military discipline could usher in prolonged instability as junior officers and enlisted men with little experience grapple to consolidate their position and to find additional sources of external aid. The new government probably would prove difficult for the West to deal with and could threaten US communications and navigation facilities in Liberia in hopes of getting more aid from Washington. Foreign investors, already worried about the risk of doing business in Liberia, would be further unnerved, and capital flight would be likely to ensue. The uncertainties in this situation would offer Moscow and Tripoli at least short-term opportunities to meddle at US expense. [REDACTED]

The United States' close and extensive ties to Liberia are well documented. This "special relationship"

makes it inevitable that Washington will be centrally involved in whatever scenario emerges. However, the widely shared pro-American sentiments of most of Liberia's military officials must be balanced against the widespread and currently fashionable prickliness over Liberia's domestic sovereignty. As such, the United States is likely to be placed in a delicate position that will make any Washington-inspired initiatives sensitive and difficult. [REDACTED]

Warning Signs

As uncertain and volatile as Liberian politics is likely to be during the next 18 months, we believe certain events or policies bear particularly close watching and could serve as signals of more significant changes ahead. In particular, we will be paying close attention for signs that:

- Doe's behavior is becoming so erratic and heavy-handed that it is alienating senior officers once loyal to the Head of State.
- Soldiers are becoming increasingly worried that a new civilian government will be less benevolent and less concerned with their economic well being, or that they have not yet had their share of the spoils.
- Growing numbers of soldiers are expressing the belief that the election is primarily a tribal concern and that it will either perpetuate or end Krahn domination, or bring leftists to power.
- Doe is contemplating removing key senior officers and replacing them with less qualified, but more loyal, officers.
- Economic hard times are making living conditions for soldiers and their families even more precarious, and fueling perceptions that Doe has forgotten the "little man." [REDACTED]

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Africa Briefs

South Africa-Lesotho	Dispute Over Arms Shipments		25X1
	<p>For the past two years, Pretoria has blocked all shipments of military equipment to Lesotho. South Africa has held up the shipment of more than 5,500 weapons and 8 million rounds of ammunition. Among the weapons kept in storage for lack of transshipment permits are 30 mortars, more than 160 machineguns, and 18 armored vehicles from the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, and Israel, as well as the USSR and North Korea.</p>		25X1
	<p>Pretoria probably sees the arms embargo as a means of putting pressure on Lesotho to accept a nonaggression pact. The small Lesotho Paramilitary Force conducts low-level counterinsurgency operations against dissidents reportedly armed by South Africa. South Africa is probably concerned that the Basotho would be unable to control the weapons and that they would fall into the hands of anti-South African movements.</p>		25X1
			25X1
			25X1
Zimbabwe	Struggling To Contain the Deficit		25X1
	<p>Zimbabwe's budget for fiscal year 1984/85 is aimed at slowing the growing government deficit. Expenditures are set to rise by 7 percent, although the prevailing rate of inflation is 19 percent. Revenues are projected to increase 8 percent. US Embassy sources report that the budget represents a victory for moderates in the government because of reductions in government operating expenditures, although these still amount to 83 percent of the new budget.</p>		25X1
	<p>The difficult economic straits, however, have not prevented Prime Minister Mugabe from pledging costly government programs. Addressing the recent ruling party congress, he renewed his commitment to land resettlement, extensive projects to develop Zimbabwe's transport system, and increased expenditures on education, housing, health, and welfare. Economic realities, however, make these programs unrealistic at present.</p>		25X1
	<p>Despite austerity measures, the planned deficit of \$560 million represents 11 percent of projected national income, substantially above the IMF's guideline of 5.5 percent, and may be a sticking point in future negotiations between Harare and the IMF. Moreover, controlling government spending may again prove difficult. Defense expenditures, for example, have been budgeted to fall by 16 percent. We expect that Mugabe will come under pressure from the military to restore defense funds in the supplemental budget next February.</p>		25X1

Secret**Military Training Switch**

25X1

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The British will replace approximately 30 Chinese instructors whose contract expires in December. Harare is not renewing Beijing's contract because of language barriers and the difficulty of integrating troops trained by the Chinese with personnel previously trained under the British system. Despite its increased responsibilities, the British training team will remain at approximately 60 personnel. The team has been in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980, providing primarily infantry and officer training.

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